(A)morally Demanding Game? An Exploration of Moral Decision-Making in a Purpose-Made Video Game by Hodge, Sarah E. et al.
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 213–225
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v7i4.2294
Article
(A)morally Demanding Game? An Exploration of Moral Decision-Making
in a Purpose-Made Video Game
Sarah E. Hodge *, Jacqui Taylor and John McAlaney
Department of Psychology, Bournemouth University, Poole, BH12 5BB, UK; E-Mails: shodge@bournemouth.ac.uk (S.E.H.),
jtaylor@bournemouth.ac.uk (J.T.), jmcalaney@bournemouth.ac.uk (J.M.)
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 27 June 2019 | Accepted: 18 October 2019 | Published: 20 December 2019
Abstract
A purpose-made video game was used to measure response time and moral alignment of in-game moral decisions, which
weremade by 115 undergraduate students. Overall, moral decisions took between 4–6 seconds andweremostly pro-social.
Previous gameplay, in-game, and post-game experiences predicted in-game moral alignment. Real-life moral salience was
not related to in-game decision-making. The implications of these results are discussed in the context of the demands of
video games and in-game moral decision-making models.
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1. Introduction
One of the distinct features of video games is their in-
teractivity (Bowman, 2018; Tamborini & Bowman, 2010).
Recent research has suggested that interactivity is a pro-
cess, involving the interaction between player and game
(Bowman, 2018; Rutledge, 2013; Stromer-Galley, 2004).
Moral decisions in video games demonstrate this process
of interactivity between player and game; many in-game
moral decisions often require players to choose from op-
tions which effect in-game outcomes. Furthermore, it
has been suggested that this interactivity leads to dif-
ferent requirements, termed as the ‘demands’ of video
games, which are categorized into types of efforts: so-
cial, emotional, cognitive, and two types of behavioral;
exertion and controls (Bowman, 2016, 2018; Bowman,
Wasserman, & Banks, 2018). Hence, the demands of
video games connect well to morality and has impli-
cations for in-game behavior, as real-life morality can
be examined through components such as moral judg-
ment and action (Haidt & Joseph, 2008; Narvaez & Rest,
1995). Moral action could be related to the behavioral
demands, especially the control demand (i.e., physically
pushing a button to make a decision). Eden, Ewoldsen,
Lee, and Beyea (2018) highlighted howphysical demands
are more than just pressing a button and can be be-
havioral affordances; which is how the individual per-
ceives and behaves within games (i.e., the action[s]
that can be taken, and how options are presented and
sequenced). Previous methodological issues in moral
decision-making research have been highlighted, for ex-
ample, the accuracy of self-reported morality due to
the gaps between moral judgment and action (American
Psychological Association, 2015; Haviv & Leman, 2002).
The benefits of exploring in-game decisions are that be-
havioral demands/affordances can be directly measured
(Eden et al., 2018; Hodge et al., 2018).
Much of the previous research has used commercial
games which can restrict aspects of the moral decision-
making process and create biases, such as reward sys-
tems (Hodge et al., 2018). Some previous research at-
tempted to addressed this, with a modified version of
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a commercial game (Joeckel, Bowman, & Dogruel, 2012,
2013).Modifying commercial games allows for these pre-
existing games to be altered and adapted for research
purposes (Elson & Quandt, 2016; Hartmann, Toz, &
Brandon, 2010;Mohseni, Liebold, & Pietschmann, 2015).
However, there are still some limitations to modifying
commercial games such as restrictions and biases. To fur-
ther address some of these limitations, purpose-made
games and Virtual Environments (VE) can be developed
for research (Hartmann et al., 2010; Hodge et al., 2018;
Huskey, Craighead, Miller, & Weber, 2018). A purpose-
made game is a game created to a specification for re-
search, in this instance a theory driven bespoke game
was developed in a game engine to measure and record
in-game moral decisions (Hodge et al., 2018). Game en-
gines are well-suited for research as they provide com-
plete control over the environment and the design of the
game/VE (Lewis, & Jacobson, 2002). The present study
aimed to explore the results of the data collected from
the purpose-made game and to understand the in-game
moral decision-making process.
Tamborini (2011, 2012) proposed the Model
of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars (MIME) to ex-
plain the decision-making process with media, includ-
ing video games. The MIME adopts the six Moral
Foundations Theory (MFT) domains of: Care/Harm (C/H);
Fairness/Cheating (F/C); Authority/Subversion (A/S);
Sanctity/Degradation (S/D); In-group Loyalty/Betrayal
(L/B); and Liberty/Oppression (L/O). TheseMFT domains
are composed of virtues, triggers, emotions, and cogni-
tion; with moral decisions consisting of both intuitive
and rational processes (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph,
2008). The MIME suggests moral judgment happens
through media activating and influencing the moral
domains salience (importance and hierarchy). Then in-
tuitive/automatic processing of the media takes place,
unless in conflict (e.g., moral violation or competing do-
mains), where reflective and deliberation processes are
activated to try and resolve the conflict, but this does
not necessarily lead to a change in decision (Tamborini,
2011, 2012). This model draws on the dual-process the-
ories; system 1, quick experiential, and system 2, slower
rational (Hartmann, 2011; Kahneman, 2011).
1.1. Rationale
Tamborini, Bowman, et al. (2016, p. 13) highlight that
research needs to develop a “dynamic understanding
of in-game decisions.” Hence, through synthesizing the
research on MFT, MIME, with the demands of video
games, creates much value for the research, helping to
understand the context and the theories that underpin
in-game moral decision-making. Thus, the contribution
of this research aims to explore aspects of the in-game
decision-making process within a purpose-made game.
Time is used frequently in gameplay, such as requir-
ing the player to respond with speed, as seen in fight-
ing/beat ‘em up games, and as a design feature, such
as timers and countdowns (Palmer, 2015; Swink, 2009).
Sensory input to muscle response takes around 240 mil-
liseconds (Swink, 2009). Moral intuitive decisions have
been suggested to take around 500–1500 milliseconds
(e.g., Tamborini, Lewis, et al., 2016), but there has been
little researchwhich has explored Response Time (RT) for
in-game moral decisions. Furthermore, considering the
dual-process theories (e.g., Hartmann, 2011), RT could
add valuable insight into the in-game decision-making
process. Therefore, questions still remain around the
players response times to in-game moral decisions:
RQ1: How long do in-game moral decisions take?
Moral positioning or alignment can represent in-game
behavior—how good, evil, or neutral the players have
chosen to be (Triberti, Villani, & Riva, 2015). Much
of the previous research has focused on post-game
effects including post-game moral behavior (American
Psychological Association, 2015; Gollwitzer & Melzer,
2012; Saleem, Anderson, & Barlett, 2015). Ellithorpe,
Cruz, Velez, Ewoldsen, and Bogert (2015) highlighted the
reciprocal relationship between in-game moral decision-
making and post-game behavior, through the process
of moral licensing, that is, the rationalisation of allow-
ing immoral behavior due to previous good behavior.
The results suggested that if participants perceived the
gameplay to be moral this predicted more anti-social
behavior post-game (Ellithorpe et al., 2015). Other re-
search has found previous gameplay experiences to be
related to in-game behavior/experience such as players
becoming morally disengaged in gameplay (Hartmann,
Krakowiak, & Tsay-Vogel, 2014; Hartmann & Vorderer,
2010; Lange, 2014). Joeckel et al. (2013) found enjoy-
ment was related to presence for both US and German
participants, and gaming experience for US participants.
However, it would have been interesting to know if pres-
ence and previous gaming experience related to in-game
moral decisions. Previous research has also shown some
overlap between in-game and real-life morality wherein
choices were suggested to mirror real-life morality and
a “strong moral presence” was found in video games
(Weaver & Lewis, 2012, p. 613). Hence, more research
is needed to understand what factors predict in-game
moral decision-making:
RQ2:Which factors of real-lifeMFT domains, previous
gameplay, in-game and post-game experiences, will
predict in-game moral alignment?
Real-life moral salience has been suggested to relate
to in-game choices, particularly, the C/H domain which
has been suggested to be intuitive (Joeckel et al.,
2012, 2013; Tamborini, Bowman, et al., 2016). Joeckel
et al. (2012, 2013) also suggested that non-salient do-
mains were related to amoral decision-making (without
morality which can have connotations of immorality).
Consequently, more research is needed to understand
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the connection between real-life moral salience and in-
game moral choices:
RQ3: How will real-life moral salience relate to in-
game moral choice and RT?
2. Method
2.1. Design
A mixed design quasi-experiment was used. The two de-
pendent variables were themoral decisions from each of
the 6 in-game MFT scenarios (see Appendix A):
1) The choices made (upholding/pro-social or
violating/anti-social, for each in-game MFT scenar-
ios). In-game moral alignment was calculated by sub-
tracting violating choice from the upholding choice.
A negative score equals more violating choices made
and a positive score equals more upholding choices
made.
2) RT was measured in milliseconds for each of the
6 MFT in-game decisions.
The predictor variables were divided into three groups
real-life morality, previous gameplay, in-game and post-
game questions (Appendix B).
2.2. Participants
115 undergraduate students took part and were re-
cruited through opportunity and volunteer sampling
(M age = 19.96; SD = 2.84). One participant with-
drew during gameplay and thirteen were excluded for
the following reasons: Moral Foundations Questionnaire
(MFQ) exclusion criteria (two questions to measure inat-
tention); leaving the room during the gameplay; and
technical problems with the purpose-made game. This
reduced the total to 101 participants. The majority re-
ported a white background (78%), with the gender of
the sample being 45% male. Ethical approval was ob-
tained from the University’s Research Ethics team, car-
ried out within accordance of the University’s Research
Ethics Code of Practice.
2.3. Materials
The materials listed below in order of completion in-
cluded the developed purpose-made game (Hodge et al.,
2018) and the measures used in the questionnaire. The
questionnaire was administered through an online sur-
vey tool, SurveyMonkey.
2.3.1. Pre-Game Questions
The MFQ32 (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008) created
scores for each of the MFT domains and were calcu-
lated from a 6-point scale: C/H 𝛼 = .69; F/C 𝛼 = .65;
L/B 𝛼 = .71; A/S 𝛼 = .74; S/D 𝛼 = .84 (Graham et al.,
2011); and L/O𝛼= .62 (Hodge, 2018; Appendix C). These
reliability alphas are only satisfactory/acceptable (Taber,
2018). It is acknowledged that the reliability scores have
an effect on analyzing the data; therefore, calculating
moral salience can support addressing this, as well as
understanding the hierarchical structure of the MFT do-
mains. Plus, moral salience has been suggested to under-
pin moral decision-making and was calculated by isolat-
ing both the highest and lowest scoring real-life MFQ do-
main(s) (Joeckel et al., 2012, 2013). Hence, categorical
dummy variables represented if the MFQ domain was
salient or non-salient (Yes/No) which was identified by
manually isolating participant’s highest and lowest scor-
ing domains.
Participants were asked questions about their previ-
ous gameplay (Appendix B), which included the follow-
ing questions: plays video games (Yes/No); if they would
describe themselves as a gamer (Yes/No); length of
time playing (0–52.50 hours); years playing games (0–26
years); number of genres played (0–19); experience and
ability (1 = Beginner/a little, to 7 = Expert/much).
2.3.2. Purpose-Made Game
Using the Unreal engine, the game was a 3D photo-
realistic first-person, role-playing game played on a PC.
Each of the MFT foundations were represented by previ-
ously tested scenarios, located in separate rooms within
the level (see Figure 1; Hodge et al., 2018). Once par-
ticipants had located the Non-Player Character (NPC),
the relevant MFT scenario was presented, then partici-
pants selected one of the two choices presented, either
uphold/pro-social choice or violated/anti-social choice.
For more information on the design of the purpose-
made game, see Appendix A, Hodge et al. (2018), and
Hodge (2018).
2.3.3. Post-Game Questions
Participants were asked to select a preferred moral align-
ment in their previous gameplay (Good/Bad/Neutral)
that were coded (Yes/No). Although a previous gameplay
question, to avoid bias, participants were asked this after
playing the purpose-made game.
Avatar attachment and empathy questions were
taken from the Temple Presence Inventory and rated
on the following scale: 1 = Not at all, to 7 = Very
much (𝛼. = 84; Lombard, Ditton, & Weinstein, 2007; see
Appendix B).
An adapted Game Engagement Questionnaire (GEQ),
which consists of 19 questions (𝛼 = .85) and rated on
the following scale: Yes = 2; Maybe = 1; and No = 0
(Brockmyer, et al., 2009), was used to measure the level
of engagement in the purpose-made game.
The Positive Affect (𝛼 = .88) and Negative Affect
(𝛼 = .85) Schedule (PANAS-X) each contained 10 items,
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Figure 1. The six in-game MFT scenarios. Note: Top left clockwise—L/O, C/H, A/S, S/D, L/B, and F/C.
with the sub-measure Guilt score obtained from 6 items
within the Negative Affect scale. The scale range in-
cluded: 1 = Very slightly, to 5 = Extremely (Watson &
Clark, 1999).
The Tangram help/hurt task was used to mea-
sure post-game pro-social and anti-social behavior.
Participants were led to believe they were assigning and
completing tangrams puzzles with a (fictitious) partici-
pant and if the other participant could complete 11 tan-
grams in 10 minutes, they won a prize. Participants se-
lected how easy or difficult they made the task. A help-
ing score was calculated from the number of easy puz-
zles greater than one, with the same process used for cal-
culating the hurting score for hard puzzles. A help/hurt
score (Tangram alignment) was calculated by subtracting
the helping from the hurting scores (Saleem et al., 2015).
2.4. Procedure
Minor deception was used as participants were told the
research involved decision-making, with the moral as-
pects of the research explained in the debrief. All data
was collected in the laboratory in one session. Once the
consent form had been signed the first questionnaire
commenced (see Section 2.3.1). Then the purpose-made
game was played in the lab. Once the game had finished
participants completed the second questionnaire (see
Section 2.3.3). Finally, the Tangram task was completed,
followed by a debrief.
3. Results
To explore howmoral decisions were made in a purpose-
made game, Table 1 shows that in-gamemoral alignment
was more pro-social and upholding (5 out of 6 domains)
with RT on average taking at least 4 seconds. L/B then
F/C had the longest RTs, which could be due to the lay-
out of the VE as these two scenarios were closest to the
beginning of the level.
The RT data had a positive skew, therefore a recip-
rocal transformation was applied to reduce the effect
of slow responses while keeping power in the data: in-
verting the data to the speed of the decision per mil-
lisecond (Whelan, 2008). In-game moral alignment was
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Table 1. Summary of descriptive statistics of the in-game moral decisions.
In-game decisions M SD t df p d
In game choice
Upheld MFT (Pro-social) 5.19 0.81
Violated MFT (Anti-social) 0.81 0.94
In-game moral alignment 4.38 1.87
RT (Seconds) by in-game MFT domain
L/B 6.61 3.13 −2.15 99 .034 −.43
F/C 5.60 2.50 1.41 99 .161 .28
C/H 4.09 2.65 −3.22 6.28 .017 −2.57
S/D 4.01 1.78 −2.56 99 .012 −.52
L/O 4.24 2.18 −3.60 99 .719 −.72
A/S 4.63 2.86 1.49 99 .140 .30
Total decision time 29.33 10.17
Total time in level 239.30 112.39
significantly correlated with total decision time r = .25
(p= .013), suggesting the quicker the decisions, themore
decisions which were upheld/pro-social. Independent
t-tests on the speed of decision and choice made sug-
gested that upholding/pro-social choices were signifi-
cantly faster than violating/anti-social choices for the do-
mains of: C/H with a large effect size; S/D with a medium
effect size; and L/B with a small effect size.
3.1. RQ1: How Long Do In-Game Moral Decisions Take?
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on speed
of decision with each of the in-game MFT domains.
Greenhouse-Geisser values are reported as Mauchly’s
test of sphericity was violated 𝜒2 (14) = 50.90 (p < .001).
Speed of decisions was significantly related to MFT do-
main F(4.15, 414.68) = 21.87 (p < .001) 𝜂2 = .18. Post
Hoc Bonferroni test suggests that the domain of in-game
L/B and F/C were significantly different (p = .015) and
slower than the other domains.
3.2. RQ2: Which Factors of Real-Life MFT Domains,
Previous Gameplay, In-Game, and Post-Game
Experiences, Will Predict In-Game Moral Alignment?
To explore what factors predicted moral alignment three
multiple linear regressions were carried out. Table 2
shows that participants on average have been playing
video games for around 7 years, with 6 types of genres
and 6 hours of gameplay a week. Over two thirds of par-
ticipants reported playing video games and a third identi-
fied as a gamer. Most of the participants wanted to help
in the Tangram task. Avatar attachment and empathy
were at the midpoint of the scale. Participants reported
more negative affect than positive affect, and feelings of
guilt were low.
To explore what factors predicted moral alignment,
Table 3 shows the only significant predictor for the first
regression was C/H, the model was not significant and
only explained around 5% of the variance. The results
of the second regression suggested the significant pre-
dictors were previous evil alignment and number of gen-
res played had negative relationships with moral align-
ment whereas ability had a positive relationship. The
third regression suggested empathywas a significant pre-
dictor with a positive relationship with in-game moral
alignment whereas engagement had a significant nega-
tive relationship.
3.3. RQ3: HowWill Real-Life Moral Salience Relate to
In-Game Moral Choice and RT?
To explore the role of real-lifemoral salience and in-game
decision-making, Table 4 shows the results of the partic-
ipant’s real-life moral salience listed in rank order. C/H
was the most salient, S/D was the lowest, and A/S re-
ceived the most violations. Chi-squared analysis on real-
life salience (low or high) and in-game choice (violate or
upheld) for eachMFT domain suggested none of the real-
life MFT domains were significantly associated with in-
gameMFT scenarios, with Cramer’s V ranging fromweak
(S/D) to strong (C/H). Independent t-tests on speed of
decision and real-life salience (Yes/No), suggested only
participants with a non-salient L/B foundation were sig-
nificantly slower than those who did not have L/B as a
non-salient foundation with a small effect size.
4. Discussion
The results suggested that in-game moral decisions took
between 4–6 seconds, were mostly pro-social (in-game
MFT domains upheld), with violations taking longer. The
following predictor variables were suggested to have
a significant relationship with in-game moral decisions:
MFQ C/H score, evil alignment, ability, number of genres
played, empathy, and engagement. Previous gameplay,
in-game and post-game regression models did predict in-
game moral decisions but not real-life morality. The MFT
domains that were upheld and salient were similar to
previous research (Joeckel et al., 2012, 2013; Tamborini,
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of continuous and categorical predictor variables.
Variables M SD
Years playing 7.63 5.96
Number of genres played 6.04 5.00
Length of time 6.61 8.22
Gaming ability 3.40 1.79
Gaming experience 3.59 2.01
Tangram help score 4.74 3.03
Tangram harm score 1.32 1.82
Tangram alignment score 3.43 4.56
Avatar attachment 2.46 1.42
Empathy 3.30 1.60
Engagement (GEQ) 11.43 6.01
Positive affect score 14.51 4.56
Negative affect score 21.07 7.39
Guilt score 9.97 4.77
Yes No
Gaming status 79 22
Gamer 34 67
Previous gameplay alignment: Good 57 44
Previous gameplay alignment: Neutral 26 75
Previous gameplay alignment: Evil 18 83
Table 3. The three multiple linear regression models with in-game moral alignment.
Regression n models R2 ΔR2 p Constant/ significant predictors B SE B β p
1) Real-life morality MFQ 0.11 0.05 .090 Constant 2.00 1.24
C/H 0.82 0.31 0.32 .010
F/C −0.28 0.38 −0.10 .458
L/B 0.03 0.35 0.01 .935
A/S 0.30 0.33 0.12 .373
S/D 0.08 0.29 0.04 .778
L/O -0.20 0.27 −0.08 .461
2) Previous gameplay 0.37 0.30 < .001 Constant 6.81 1.76
Number of genres played −0.20 0.06 −0.53 .001
Ability 0.48 0.23 0.46 .042
Gaming status 0.78 0.50 0.17 .124
Years playing 0.03 0.04 0.08 .538
Gamer −0.14 0.54 −0.04 .797
Length of time −0.01 0.03 −0.04 .771
Experience −0.16 0.25 −0.18 .507
Previous neutral alignment −0.66 0.39 −0.15 .090
Previous evil alignment −1.98 0.48 −0.41 <.001
3) In-game and post-game 0.18 0.12 .008 Constant 3.70 0.79
measures Positive affect 0.04 0.09 0.09 .701
Negative affect 0.00 0.03 0.01 .923
Guilt scale 0.02 0.09 0.04 .866
Engagement (GEQ) −0.08 0.04 −0.24 .035
Tangram 0.08 0.04 0.18 .061
Avatar attachment −0.26 0.15 −0.20 .072
Empathy 0.36 0.13 0.31 .008
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Table 4.MFT salience with in-game moral choice and RTs.
Percentage Percentage of in-game
MFT domain Salience of salience MFT upheld χ2 (1) p V t(99) p d
C/H Highest 51.5 96.0 4.42 .052 .21 −0.59 .558 −.12
F/C High 32.7 98.0 0.99 .451 .10 0.81 .423 .16
L/O High 24.8 96.0 1.43 .255 .12 0.08 .938 .02
A/S Low 21.8 67.3 2.09 .118 .14 0.54 .589 .12
L/B Low 29.7 69.3 0.14 .440 .19 2.14 .035 .43
S/D Lowest 58.4 91.1 3.78 .051 .04 −0.85 .400 −.17
Bowman, et al., 2016). Tamborini, Bowman, et al. (2016)
suggested differences in MFT domains could be due to
how they are processed/accessed. Interestingly, C/H and
S/D were the quickest domains and at the extreme ends
of salience, therefore, this could suggest that the highest
and lowest salient domains are processed differently.
The results suggested participants preferred to be
helpful both in-game and post-game, which could sug-
gest similarities and/or reciprocal relationship between
in-game and post-game behavior (e.g., Ellithorpe et al.,
2015). Alternatively, as negative affect was higher than
positive affect, this could have led to compensation by
being helpful post-game (e.g., Ellithorpe et al., 2015;
Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012). Furthermore, empathy sig-
nificantly predicted more pro-social choices and posi-
tive in-game alignment. Therefore, empathy could have
a specific role in gameplay, which has been found previ-
ously (Grizzard, Tamborini, Lewis,Wang, & Prabhu, 2014;
Grizzard, Tamborini, Sherry, & Weber, 2017). This could
suggest the game was emotionally demanding, how-
ever, scores on other emotional measures, such as the
PANAS, were low. Furthermore, if decisions were being
rationalized (as reflected in the time taken), it was un-
likely that system 1 was being used, which is more con-
nected to emotional processes, and hence the purpose-
made game was unlikely to be emotionally demanding
(Hartmann, 2011; Kahneman, 2011). In contrast to em-
pathy, game engagement had a significant negative rela-
tionship with pro-social choices and in-game alignment.
This might suggest a trade-off is made between invest-
ment in the game and empathy e.g., empathy vs evil
alignment (Triberti et al., 2015). Furthermore, this re-
lates to the choice of the gut or the game, suggested
by Joeckel et al. (2012, 2013), if participants chose em-
pathy/gut they would uphold moral choices, whereas if
they chose engagement in the game, they would make
more violating choices. This trade-off could be explained
by the demands of video games, as it demonstrates po-
tential processes and interaction between player and
game: i.e., which demand determines how the trade-off
is managed/decided and which demands get overridden.
Since the data suggested that overall real-life moral-
ity did not predict in-game decision-making, it could
indicate that participants were playing to their own
preference and/or strategy. This is supported by previ-
ous research that found players have a preference for
moral decisions, which tend to be pro-social (Lange,
2014; Triberti et al., 2015) and use strategies (Schell,
2014; Sicart, 2010). This could also be represented in
the results of previous gameplay, explaining the most
variance with evil alignment and ability being signifi-
cant predictors and suggest previous preferences and
strategies. Another possibility is that strategies are re-
lated to cognitive demands. Further support could be
suggested from the RTs where participants could have
been deliberating on these decisions and using system 2
(Hartmann, 2011; Kahneman, 2011; Tamborini, 2011).
If system 2 was engaged this could have overridden
emotional demands potentially for cognitive demands.
Furthermore, these strategies may override/outweigh
morality and could relate to moral disengagement and
management in gameplay (Hartmann & Vorderer, 2010;
Klimmt, Schmid, Nosper, Hartmann, & Vorderer, 2006).
Another explanation is that the decisions in the purpose-
made game were being rationalized and perceived as
amoral: where participants (consciously or not) did not
engage morality. One reason could be that participants
were trying to understand new experiences/learn from
the game; which could be reflected in L/B reporting the
longest RTs as this was likely to be the first decisionmade.
Cognitive demands, such as skill, have been previ-
ously found to overlap with behavioral demands, such as
performance in the game (Bowman, Weber, Tamborini,
& Sherry, 2013) and likewise moral agency requires
both moral judgment (cognitive) and action (behavior;
Bandura, 2002). Eden et al. (2018) highlight the role of so-
cial aspects in behavioral affordances. Therefore, the role
of empathy and interacting with NPCs in the purpose-
made game could suggest social demands. Conversely,
it is important to note that avatar attachment was low
which could have influenced the social interactions and
suggested a low social demand (Banks & Bowman, 2016).
One of the limitations of this study is that it took
place in a laboratory and could be different from partic-
ipants’ normal video game experience. This could have
also led to social desirability from participants playing
the game to meet perceived expectations, rather than
how they might normally play games. Additionally, par-
ticipants could have picked an option based onwhat they
might have found to be entertaining/fun. Also, themajor-
ity of participants selected pro-social/upholding choice,
therefore, anti-social/violating choices were underrepre-
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sented. Due to time restrictions only NPCs that were re-
quired for interactions were included; addingmore NPCs
can enhance the realism, interactivity, and create a bus-
ier VE (Warpefelt & Verhagen, 2016). Also, participants
may have not benefited from making fast decisions, as
the game did not specifically facilitate quick responses,
which could have influenced the speed of decisions. It is
also acknowledged there are limitations within the MFT
theory such as modularity of the foundations (Suhler &
Churchland, 2011) and the participant sample only con-
sisting of university students. The results ofMFT salience
had limitations from how it was calculated, in that the
salient domains may not be significantly different from
the next highest and lowest domains.
Many of the inconsistencies with previous research
could be due to the complex nature of morality contain-
ing different components, therefore, highlighting the im-
portance of understanding and mapping the demands
of video games, for both commercial and purpose-made
games. Tamborini, Bowman, et al. (2016) found that
MFT domains influence in-game decisions; however,
this influence is affected by the game design. Future
research could explore in-game intuitive versus delib-
erative reasoning, and measure the demands of the
purpose-made game to support understanding in-game
experiences/decision-making.
5. Conclusions
Exploring in-game RTs and moral alignment in a purpose-
made game with the demands of video games demon-
strates the complex nature of in-game moral decision-
making. The results suggested in-game decisions were
mostly pro-social and took between 4–6 seconds, with
previous gameplay, in-game, and post-game experiences
predicting moral alignment. Overall, real-life morality
and salience was not related to in-game decision-making
in this study; rather in-game decisions seemed to be
more rational and cognitively demanding and thus, not
driven by intuitions.
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Appendix
1. Appendix A: The Purpose-Made Game and the Six MFT In-Game Scenarios
1.1. Game Synopsis
The purpose-made game was designed to reduce and remove biases, as such the game does not have a strong focus
on narrative. The environment and NPCs were designed and made to look as realistic as possible. Due to the large size of
the purpose-made game files there is a dedicated computer lab to run these types of experiments. At the beginning of
the game participants were given instructions on how to play the game, including that they will be making decisions in the
game. There was also a short tutorial at the beginning to demonstrate the only options that participants will be presented
within the game. The keyboard controlled the movements of the participants in-game avatar’s body (only avatar’s hands
seen by participants) and to interact with NPCs. The mouse controlled where the avatar’s head was looking. Left and right
buttons on the mouse were how participants made the in-game choice and corresponded to the in-game presentation of
the choices.
Each scenario was in the form of short vignettes. The text in italics was presented to participants in the game; the
in-game vignette followed by the two options for each MFT domain. The descriptions that were used for validating the
vignette have also been included to add context, since this would have been seen in the gameplay.
1.1.1. Scenario Care/Harm
Description: You see a person is injured and holding their abdomen, crying while they are slumped on the ground.
In-Game vignette: [Sobbing] Ouch, ouch I am injured; these heavy books fell on me, ouch.
Pro-social choice—Upholds MFT: Help the injured person, pick up books and help them up.
Anti-social choice—Violates MFT: Hurt the injured person more, drop more books on them.
1.1.2. Scenario Fairness/Cheating
Description: You see a person is struggling to share out coins equally (with another), because some are damaged, smaller,
and worthless.
In-Game vignette: [Sighs] These coins are difficult to share out equally, some are damaged and worthless.
Pro-social choice—Upholds MFT: Help restore the coins’ value and divide them equally.
Anti-social choice—Violates MFT: Damage more coins and divide the coins unequally.
1.1.3. Scenario Loyalty/Betrayal
Description: You see a person is giving others each a chest containing a written private promise, and all swear to secrecy.
In-Game vignette: [Whispers] In these chests is a private promise, all agreed to swear to secrecy.
Pro-social choice—Upholds MFT: Put locks on the chests and protect the promise.
Anti-social choice—Violates MFT: Destroy the chests, open and display the promise.
1.1.4. Scenario Authority/Subversion
Description: You see a General is holding a pair of boots which are scuffed and orders them to be sorted out.
In-Game vignette: [Commands] You! This scuffed pair of boots on the windowsill, sort them out!
Pro-social choice—Upholds MFT:Mend and polish the boots, to sort them out.
Anti-social choice—Violates MFT: Damage the boots more, not sorting them out.
1.1.5. Scenario Sanctity/Degradation
Description: You see a person is trying to maintain the waste system that contains sewage, which is leaking out.
In-Game vignette: [Sighs] This waste system needs to be maintained and is leaking sewage.
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Pro-social choice—Upholds MFT: Fix and strengthen the waste system and cleanse the area.
Anti-social choice—Violates MFT: Destroy and damage the waste system causing more leakage.
1.1.6. Scenario Liberty/Oppression
Description: You see a person is trying to construct and open a stage to allow for people’s free expression.
In-Game vignette: [Sighs] This stage is difficult to construct and open for people’s free expression.
Pro-social choice—Upholds MFT: Help create the stage to allow for free expression.
Anti-social choice—Violates MFT: Destroy the stage to control and stop free expression.
2. Appendix B: Predictor Variables
Table 5. Individual predictor variables for the three regression models.
Regression model Predictor variables Response/range N
Real-life morality MFQ32 scores:
— Care/Harm (C/H) 0–5 101
— Fairness/Cheating (F/C) 0–5 101
— Authority/Subversion (A/S) 0–5 101
— Sanctity/Degradation (S/D) 0–5 101
— (In-group) Loyalty/ Betrayal (L/B) 0–5 101
— Liberty/Oppression (L/O) scores 0–5 101
Previous video Plays video games Yes/No 101
game play Would describe themselves as a gamer Yes/No 101
Previous good alignment Yes/No 101
Previous bad alignment* Yes/No 101
Previous neutral alignment Yes/No 101
Length of time 0–52.50 hours 101
Years playing 0–26 years 100
Number of genres played* 0–19 101
Experience 0–7 101
Ability* 0–7 101
Post-game questions Empathy* (2 item): 0–7 101
1. How much did you empathize with the characters in the game?
2. How connected did you feel with the other characters in the game?
Avatar Attachment (3 item): 0–7 101
1. How much did you identify with your avatar?
2. How attached did you feel with your avatar?
3. Did you feel that avatar was you?
Tangrams help/hurt task −9–9 101
Engagement (GEQ)* 0–32 101
PANAS-X 10–50 101
— Guilt score 6–30 101
Notes: Forced entrymethodwas used on all three regressions as no hierarchywas applied to the input of variables. * denotes a significant
predictor.
3. Appendix C: Liberty/Oppression Scale
The Liberty/Oppression scale items followed the same format as the rest of the MFQ (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008)
3.1. Part 1—Moral Relevance
Whether or not someone was controlled by another person.
Whether or not someone was restricted by their government.
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Whether or not someone was free to choose how to live their life.
3.2. Part 2—Moral Judgment
People should not be oppressed by their government.
People should not be forbidden to make their own decisions.
People have the right to disagree with those in power.
Although the Cronbach’s Alpha was satisfactory/acceptable (𝛼= .62) and similar to the otherMFQ domains (Graham et al.,
2008; Taber, 2018). It is acknowledged this is a new scale and has not had the level of testing and validation of the other
MFT domains. For more information on the development of the scale see Hodge (2018).
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